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Over the past decade, several U.S. trade laws have, for the first time in
recent U.S. history, linked international trade benefits to respect for labor
rights. Several of the worker rights provisions incorporated in these statutes
mirror two of the three categories of fundamental worker rights delineated by
the International Labour Organisation (ILO). However, worker rights-linked
trade laws' are starkly silent with respect to the third category of fundamental-
rights specified by the ILO: equality of opportunity and treatment,2 including
freedom from gender-based discrimination in the workplace. Thus U.S. trade
laws contain no provisions explicitly aimed at promoting respect for the rights
of working women. While acknowledging this critical omission, this paper
argues that worker rights-linked trade laws could, albeit unintentionally and
indirectly, uniquely benefit female workers laboring in the export sector of
developing countries. The realization of these benefits, however, depends on
a number of political and economic variables and on the institutionalization of
these benefits at the foreign national level.
Worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws do not, in their intended
impact, distinguish between male and female workers in foreign countries. In
theory, women workers could benefit from the application of these laws in
equal measure to their male counterparts. In reality, women often face restrict-
ed employment opportunities or inferior working conditions (or both) that
indirectly circumscribe potential benefits. However, certain segments of the
female work force in developing countries are uniquely positioned to benefit
from worker rights-linked U.S. trade laws. Specifically, women who work in
t The author is an international economist with the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International
Labor Affairs. This paper expresses only the views of the author and does not reflect the position or opinion
of the U.S. Department of Labor or of the U.S. Government.
1. Trade laws containing worker rights provisions are herein referred to as "worker rights-linked trade
laws."
2. According to the ILO, "fundamental" or "basic" human rights are: 1) freedom of association
(including freedom to organize and bargain collectively), 2) freedom from forced labor, and 3) equality
of opportunity and treatment(including equal remuneration and freedom from discrimination). See INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATiONALLABoR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-
1981, at 1, 7, 42, 49 (1982) [hereinafter ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
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export processing zones (EPZs)3 may inadvertently benefit from statutory
language that explicitly extends specific worker rights to "designated zones"
in the foreign country. These "designated zones" generally refer to EPZs.
While several articles have analyzed the worker rights provisions in U.S. trade
laws, none has focused on the probable effect of these laws on working women
in developing countries.4
The application of U.S. trade laws to "designated zones" reflects congres-
sional and public concern over the impact of certain zone practices on domestic
trade policy and on domestic and foreign labor rights. For example, some EPZ
authorities and foreign governments deny rights generally applicable in the
foreign national territory to workers in EPZs. Others have established EPZ
labor standards, such as a minimum wage, below prevailing foreign national
standards.5 Labor unions and other parties involved in trade policy debates
argue that these practices confer an unfair trade advantage by effectively
subsidizing foreign exports into the U.S. market.6
Young women comprise the majority of production workers in EPZs,
which have been growing in size and number over the last decade.7 Thus, the
inclusion of statutory language on zones in worker rights-linked trade laws
could, other things being equal, benefit women workers in the export sector
3. EPZs (also known as "free trade zones" and "export free zones") are usually special enclaves for
the manufacture and/or assembly of goods for export wherein firms typically enjoy freedom from import
and export tariffs and may also receive an array of tax and investment incentives. In a joint study, the
International Labor Organization and United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC)
stated: "Definitions as to what constitutes an export processing zone are at least as numerous as the names
used to describe this phenomenon." INTERNATIONAL LABoUR ORG. & UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON
TRANSNAT'L CORPS., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTs OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES 4 (1988) [hereinafter ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS]. For example, EPZs may be
broadly defined to include entire countries or territories, such as Hong Kong or Singapore, which have
no tariffs or import restrictions.
Individual firms and/or plants (such as maquiladoras in Mexico or Licensed Manufacturing Warehous-
es in Malaysia) may receive the same treatment as EPZs in some countries. Throughout this paper, I define
EPZs as either enclaves or individual plants for assembly or light manufacturing activities where at least
80% of the output produced is destined for export, where inputs and exports are eligible for duty-free
treatment, and where firms typically enjoy other fiscal and financial incentives.
Congressional interest in EPZs vis-!t-vis international trade and worker rights was first evidenced in
implementation guidelines for the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat.
384 (1983), as amended by the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§
2701-2706 (West Supp. 1991)). See infra part III; see also Steve Charnovitz, Caribbean Basin Initiative:
Setting Labor Standards, 44 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 54-56 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation
and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990); Ian Charles Ballon, The Implications
of Making the Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1987).
5. These standards will be spoken of as "differentially-lower labor standards."
6. This subsidy would be in the form of lowered production (variable labor) costs, resulting from an
"artificial" lowering of labor standards (such as wages and overtime) that would otherwise have increased
the flow of income and benefits to workers.
7. 1 BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER RIGHTS IN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES 5 (1990) [hereinafter WORKER RIGHTS].
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of developing countries. It is critical to recognize, however, that the potential
benefits accruing to female workers through these laws are contingent on the
practical ability of trade statutes to effectuate meaningful labor reforms in
developing countries. In reality, a complex array of variables determines
whether any meaningful reform can be achieved.' Four of the critical factors
determining the influence and impact of worker rights-linked U.S. trade laws
are:
1) The role and strength of foreign national governments (in relation to, for
example, employers' associations and para-military groups) in the creation
and enforcement of worker rights;
2) The importance to the foreign country of manufacturing exports to the
United States, measured by the value of trade preferences received from
the United States and the degree of dependence on access to the U.S.
market, and affecting the country's perceived reliance on maintaining low
wages and benefits to retain an "edge" in competitive international trade;
3) Foreign policy considerations for both the United States and the foreign
country, including perceived tactical gains or losses resulting from a U.S.
threat to impose (or to respond to) unilateral trade measures, and compet-
ing or conflicting intragovernmental goals; and
4) The configuration and relative strength of worker and employer blocs
within the foreign country, as well as pressures from international interest
organizations.
Given these various interactive elements, it is nearly impossible to predict
the long-term influence of worker rights-linked U.S. trade laws on worker
rights in affected foreign countries, let alone on women workers who may
benefit only indirectly from these laws. Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to evaluate the efficacy of these laws to date,9 observers have pointed
to both apparent successes and failures during their short history. Chile is most
frequently cited as a case in which the suspension of U.S. trade preferences
helped to focus attention on human rights problems and contributed to impor-
tant labor law reforms.1" Myanmar (formerly Burma), which was removed
from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1989," is cited as a
8. For two cogent analyses an this subject, see PETER DORMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER
RIGHTS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF WORKER RIGHTS CONDrfONALITY UNDER THE
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (1989); LAwYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WORKER RIGHTS
UNDER THE U.S. TRADE LAWS 1988 PROJECT SERIES No. 2 (1989).
9. The most long-standing of these programs, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2706 (1988), has been in effect only eight years. The Generalized System of Preferences is
currently in its fifth annual review cycle (following a general review in 1985-1986). For a discussion of
these laws and programs, see infra part III.
10. See, e.g., DORMAN, supra note 8, at 13-14; FAY LYLE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER RIGHTS
IN U.S. POLICY 14, 15 (1991).
11. Actions Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 3 C.F.R. 262, 263 (1990).
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case in which the removal has generated few improvements. 12 However, none
of these administrative decisions has focused on women workers per se.
The inclusion of language on EPZs in worker rights-linked trade laws has
helped to spotlight the status of labor rights and working conditions in zones
in countries subject to U.S. worker rights reviews. It is too soon to evaluate
whether this attention will precipitate long term, sustainable reforms. By
extension, and given the absence of any empirical evidence, it is premature
to speculate what benefits, if any, have actually accrued to working women
in EPZs. Further, even while we recognize that worker rights-linked trade laws
can have a positive impact on the predominantly female work force in EPZs,
the structure of employment opportunities in zones will, in all likelihood,
continue to perpetuate occupational segregation by gender. For example,
women may be helped by a country's agreement (in the wake of a worker
rights review) to allow the formation of trade unions in zones, but still face
very restricted occupational and salary opportunities in what amounts to a zone
"gender ghetto."' 3 As another example, while a lower general minimum wage
imposed on EPZs would probably be considered actionable under worker
rights-linked trade laws, a lower minimum wage established for a zone industry
characterized by a predominantly female work force would not be action-
able."4 In short, gender-based, discriminatory working conditions and a pano-
ply of other issues of critical concern to women workers remain stubbornly
outside the grasp of worker rights provisions in U.S. trade statutes.
This paper begins by reviewing current worker rights provisions in U.S.
international trade laws. It then discusses the implication of statutory language
on "designated zones" for the rights of women laboring in the export sector
of developing countries. This paper concludes that whatever benefits accrue
to working women in EPZs through the implementation of worker rights-linked
trade laws will necessarily be indirect and tenuous and will fall far short of
addressing the specific needs of working women. Benefits are tenuous at best,
because the leverage that can be exerted through these statutes is uncertain.
Moreover, we have no guarantee that benefits will be institutionalized at the
foreign national level.
12. LYLE, supra note 10, at 14.
13. I am referring here to pervasive EPZ hiring preferences for young females in traditional EPZ
industries (such as textiles, electronics, and apparel), in low-skilled, production-operator positions.
14. This disparity exists for two reasons. First, the ILO sanctions variable, industry-specific minimum
wages, so the imposition of a wage differential by industry would not constitute an "unacceptable" condition
of work under the GSP. See infra part III. Second, the consideration of any discriminatory effect on women
falls outside the purview of U.S. worker rights-linked trade laws.
Vol. 17:173, 1992
Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WORKER RIGHTS
The majority of U.S. international trade laws containing worker rights
provisions employ the language "internationally recognized worker rights"
(IRWRs) to establish five rights and standards: 1) freedom of association; 2)
the right to organize and bargain collectively; 3) a prohibition on the use of
forced or compulsory labor; 4) a minimum age for the employment of chil-
dren; and 5) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health. Section 503(a) of the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984 (Renewal Act) first
enumerated and defined these five rights.15
The first three IRWRs are considered fundamental human rights by the
ILO 6 and are codified most prominently in the Convention Concerning Free-
dom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 7 the Convention
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to
Bargain Collectively," the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labour, 9 and the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour.2"
United States labor law protects the right of workers to associate and bargain
collectively through the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,1 while
the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits forced lab6r.'
Several other important ILO conventions provide support for the latter two
IRWRs? In U.S. law, standards relating to thefourth and fifth IRWRs were
15. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(a)(4) (1988).
16. International Labour Conventions and Recommendations are adopted by the International Labour
Conference after consultation with all 151 member nations. The Conference is a tripartite body composed
of government, employer, and worker delegates. When a member nation ratifies an ILO convention, it
becomes subject to legally binding international obligations. While many other ILO conventions pertain
to the first three IRWRs, those listed here are considered among the most widely recognized by the
international community.
17. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protectionof the Right to Organize (Conven-
tion No. 87) (entered into force July 4, 1950), reprinted in ILO CoNVENTIoNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 2, at 4. For example, respect for the right to associate freely is considered so important that
the ILO monitors and reports on complaints in this area regardless of whether a member state has ratified
Convention 87.
18. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain
Collectively (Convention No. 98) (entered into force July 18, 1951), reprinted in ILO CONVENTI9NS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
19. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Convention No. 29) (entered into force
May 1, 1932), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 29.
20. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (Convention No. 105) (entered into force
Jan. 17, 1959), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 39.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988). The right of free association is also guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
23. Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (Convention No. 138)
(entered into force June 19, 1976), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
2, at 730; Convention Concerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special Reference to Developing Countries
(Convention No. 138) (entdred into force Apr. 29, 1972), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 2, at230; Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial
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also promulgated in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193824 and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970.1
According to two of the key participants who crafted the worker rights
language incorporated in the GSP Renewal Act of 1984, the ultimate choice
of these five IRWRs reflected political compromise and an assessment of which
provisions would be politically palatable.' Thus, the five IRWRs do not
perfectly mirror either U.S. laws or ILO conventions but reflect some areas
of congruence. For example, the Renewal Act makes no explicit reference to
the right to strike as an IRWR, because this right is restricted under U.S.
law.' Similarly, the Renewal Act sets no minimum age for the employment
of children, due to disagreements regarding the extent to which minimum age
should be tied to a country's level of economic development. 28 The ambiguity
of the statutes leaves open the question whether any or all of these criteria are
rights or merely standards: that is whether they should be applied absolutely,
or applied less strictly according to a country's level of development. Whether
each IRWR is an absolute right or a relative standard continues to be the
subject of policy disagreement over the administration of the GSP Renewal Act
of 1984. The reporting guidelines (developed by the Department of State in
its annual Human Rights Report for each of the IRWRs) suggest a possible
taxonomy:
Differences in levels of economic development are taken into account in the
formulation of internationally-recognized labor standards. For example, many ILO
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their scope and
coverage.., countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve the higher
levels specified in such standards .... It should be understood, however, that this
flexibility applies only to internationally-recognized standards concerning working
conditions. No flexibility is permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic
principles contained in human rights standards, i.e., freedom of association, the
Undertakings (Convention No. 14) (entered into force June 19, 1923), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 301; Convention Concerning Weekly Rest in Commerce and Offices
(Convention No. 106) (entered into force Mar. 4, 1959), reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND REcoM-
i~mNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 304; Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the
Working Environment (Convention No. 155) (entered into force Aug. 11, 1983), reprinted in ILO
CONVENONs AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 350.
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
26. Telephone Interview with William Goold, Administrative Assistant to Representative Donald Pease
(D-Ohio) (July 1991); Telephone Interview with Pharis Harvey, International Labor Rights Education and
Research Fund (Nov. 1991). Goold and Harvey were actively involved in drafting the worker rights
language incorporated into the GSP Renewal Act of 1984.
27. Telephone Interview with Pharis Harvey, supra note 26. The ILO also places conditions on the
right to strike but considers ita fundamental tenet of the right of association. For a discussion of qualifica-
tions on the right to strike under U.S. law, see 2 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 995-1032 (Charles J. Morriss ed., 2d ed. 1983).
28. Telephone Interview with Pharis Harvey, supra note 26.
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right to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, and the
absence of discrimination. 29
These guidelines tend to reinforce the position taken by some parties (e.g.,
trade unions) that the first three IRWRs must be applied absolutely when
evaluating a country's conformity with worker rights provisions under U.S.
trade laws. To date, however, administrative agencies have treated these guide-
lines as recommendations intended primarily to assist foreign labor officers
in their reporting functions.
Thus, the first three IRWRs defined under U.S. trade laws parallel the
taxonomy of basic human rights defined by the ILO,30 but these laws make
no mention of the LO's third main category of fundamental rights, subsumed
under the heading "Equality of Opportunity and Treatment." A bill introduced
by Representative Donald Pease (D-Ohio) in 1984 to revise the GSP program
tried to make "the prohibition and elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation" an IRWR for purposes of the GSP.31 However,
in negotiations preliminary to consideration of an expansive definition of
IRWRs by the House Subcommittee on Trade (of the Committee on Ways and
Means), this provision was deemed "untenable" as a workable criterion for
evaluating labor rights observance, and was therefore withdrawn.32
III. U.S. TRADE LAWS INCORPORATING WORKER RIGHTS PROVISIONS
Five U.S. laws currently condition assistance or access on respect for
IRWRs, four of these laws authorize programs of trade or investment assis-
tance, while the fifth governs direct access to U.S. markets.33 These laws are
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),34 which implemented
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP);35 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC);3  U.S. partic-
29. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, 102d
CONG., IST Sass. 1694 (Joint Comm. Print 102-5 of Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs 1991). United States trade statutes do not include discrimination as an actionable
worker rights practice. The quoted passage reflects the ILO's position on flexibility vis-h-vis what it
considers to be absolute as opposed to relative standards.
30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31. H.R. 5136, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
32. Telephone Interview with William Goold, supra note 26. One participant in the process has noted
that the political feasibility of including freedom from discrimination as an IRWR was diminished by the
then recent defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment. See Telephone Interview with Pharis Harvey, supra
note 26.
33. A comprehensive description of the history, development, and substance of these laws can be found
in Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. Approach, 9 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 253 (1988) [hereinafter Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade]; Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Worker Rights in
the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Compeitiveness Act, 44 LAB. L.J. 222 (1990).
34. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2706 (West Supp. 1991)). Section 212 (19 U.S.C. § 2702) was amended
in 1990 to incorporate the same worker rights language that was added to the GSP Renewal Act of 1984,
codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2464 (1988). See H. R. REP. No. 101-650, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988).
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ipation in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), authorized
by the MIGA Act 7 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.38 With the
exception of the MIGA Act, which will be discussed later, these laws contain
uniform language explicitly extending to any "designated zone" in the foreign
country the same statutory criteria that are applied to the country generally.
The logic behind the application of statutory worker rights standards to both
EPZs and the foreign national territory is compelling from the standpoint of
trade policy. Differentially-lower labor standards in EPZs could confer an
unfair trade advantage on foreign exporters by lowering their production costs.
The cost advantage thus received by exporting firms would distort trade flows.
Differentially-lower labor standards in EPZs might also be construed as an
effective subsidy, arguably subject to the imposition of countervailing duties
under U.S. law.39
A. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)
40
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, signed into law in 1983,
was the first legislation in recent U.S. history to link international trade
benefits to foreign labor laws and practices. 4 ' This preferential trade program
provides unilateral duty-free treatment to a wide range of imports from desig-
nated developing countries in the Caribbean Basin.
The original worker rights language included in CBERA directed the
President, when designating a beneficiary country, to consider "the degree to
which workers in such country are afforded reasonable workplace conditions
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively. "42 Since neither
36. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
37. 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k to 290k-li (1988).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2411-2420 (1988).
39. United States countervailing duty (CVD) law is contained in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
sec. 331, 88 Stat. 2049 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988)). CVD provisions define
a subsidy as a "bounty or grant" paid or bestowed 'upon the manufacture or production or export of any
article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country." 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988). They
provide for the levying of a countervailing duty on such articles equal to the net amount of the subsidy.
To date, no U.S. CVD determinations have been made on the rationale that lower worker rights standards
constitute a subsidy for export. In terms of international trade rules, Charnovitz maintains that "if the GATT
Subsidy (sic) Code is broadened to include government actions on a 'benefit to recipient' standard, or
actions that are 'off budget,' a good case could be made that any exemption of EPZs from otherwise
applicable labor laws or regulatory practices should be subject to international discipline." See Steve
Charnovitz, Hidden Subsidies, 2 INT'L ECON. INSiGHTs, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at20 (reviewing WOKR RmHTS,
supra note 7).
40. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2706 (West Supp. 1991).
41. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade, supra note 33, at 253-55. Perez-Lopez notes: "The earliest
instance of U.S. Congressional action regulating trade in goods produced abroad under substandard labor
conditions of which we are aware was in the context of the Tariff Act of 1890, which banned imports of
goods manufactured by convict labor.' Id. at 254.
42. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 212(c)(8), 97 Stat. 384, 387
(1983) (prior to 1990 amendment). This criterion was one of eleven discretionary criteria to be considered
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"reasonable workplace conditions" nor "the right to organize and bargain
collectively" were defined in the statute or its legislative history, the U.S.
government relied on ILO conventions and case law for guidance, in tandem
with a review of "local circumstances and the progress a country is making
toward better conditions." 43
One of the factors considered by the United States to determine which
countries to designate for CBERA benefits was the level of labor standards
provided in EPZs. Steve Charnovitz, a member of the U.S. government
interagency task force that reviewed the eligibility of Caribbean Basin countries
for designation under CBERA, states that at the time of the initial eligibility
review in 1983, EPZs had become a focus of concern for the ILO and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), because officials
in some countries either had suspended nationally applicable worker rights or
had established lower labor standards in EPZs." According to Charnovitz,
"some of these zones had abusive labor conditions compared with the rest of
the country that gave the zone's production an unfair competitive advantage
in international markets. For example, in some of these zones, the governments
prohibited trade unions. "I Charnovitz states that the AFL-CIO actively
voiced these concerns to the Reagan Administration during the government's
initial review of Caribbean Basin countries in 1983.' Thus, because they
served as platforms for export to the U.S. market, and because labor advocates
viewed the imposition of differentially-lower standards in EPZs as an implicit
export subsidy, these zones became both a trade and a labor issue in the
designation of Caribbean Basin countries.
Implementation of the worker rights criterion in CBERA set a precedent
for including zones in subsequent worker rights language. In 1990, CBERA
was amended to incorporate the same worker rights language found in the GSP
statute,47 as discussed below.
B. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
The GSP program provides nonreciprocal duty-free tariff treatment on
eligible products to designated "beneficiary developing countries" (BDCs) to
in country designation.
43. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade, supra note 33, at 261-62.
44. Telephone Interview with Steve Charnovitz, Consultant, Competitiveness Policy Council (Nov.
1991).
45. See Chamovitz, supra note 3, at 55.
46. Telephone Interview with Steve Charnovitz, supra note 44.
47. CBERA was amended by the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (West
Supp. 1991). This amendment requires the President, in determining whether to designate any country a
beneficiary country under CBERA, to take into account "whether or not such country has taken or is taking
steps to afford to workers in that country (including any designated zone) internationally recognized worker
rights." 19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c)(8) (West Supp. 1991).
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promote economic development.4" In 1990, the United States offered GSP
duty-free treatment to some 4,230 products from 134 designated beneficiary
countries and territories. GSP duty-free imports into the United States totaled
$11.1 billion in 1990. The top five BDCs (Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil,
and the Philippines) accounted for sixty-five percent of the total.49
When the GSP program was renewed by the Renewal Act,5" the criteria
for designating a BDC were amended in several ways. Section 502(b) of the
Renewal Act added the first mandatory worker rights criterion in the statute,
and reiterated this criterion with respect to the discretionary factors to be
considered by the President when designating a BDC. 15 Prior to the Act, no
mandatory or discretionary worker rights criteria were part of the BDC
designation process. Section 502(b)(7) of the Renewal Act now states that "the
President shall not designate any country a beneficiary developing country
under this section... if such country has not taken or is not taking steps to
afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country
(including any designated zone in that country).""s Section 502(a)(4) defines
the five IRWRs described above.53
Following a general review of all BDCs and eligible products in 1985-
1986, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issued implementing
regulations that would permit "any person," on an annual basis, to "file a
request to have the GSP status of any eligible beneficiary developing country
reviewed with respect to any of the designation criteria . . . ."" Labor and
human rights groups have actively engaged in the annual GSP review process
by petitioning for the removal of countries alleged to have violated statutory
criteria. As of the beginning of the fifth annual review cycle (1991-1992, in
addition to the general review of 1985-1986), petitions have been filed with
48. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988).
49. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 TRADE PoLIcY AGENDA AND 1990 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 98, 99 (1991). Data on
1990 imports are from the GSP Subcommittee to the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR), March 1991.
50. Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 501-508, 98 Stat. 3018 (1984) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466
(1988)).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4) (1988).
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988) (emphasis added). The legislative history of the GSP Renewal Act
of 1984 illustrates congressional intent with respect to the inclusion of language on designated zones:
The reference in both section 502(b)(8) and section 502(c) to any designated zone in the particular
country is intended to ensure that consideration of whether a particular country conforms to these
provisions is based upon the existence of substantial uniformity between the conditions relating
to internationally recognized worker rights in such zones and such rights otherwise applicable
to workers in that country. The purpose of the provision is to ensure that designated zones are
not used by the country as a means to circumvent the designation criteria on workers rights and
to ensure the application of these criteria to the country as a whole.
H.R. REP. No. 98-1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (1984).
53. See supra part II.
54. Regulations of the USTR Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Countries for the Generalized
System of Preferences Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1991) [hereinafter USTR Regulations].
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the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee challenging thirty-
four BDCs on worker rights grounds.5'
Fifteen countries were accepted for full review and were found to have met
the statutory requirements. Eight countries were suspended or terminated; three
of these countries were subsequently reinstated in February 1991.5" Chile,
for example, was one of the three countries reinstated in 1991, following the
election of a democratic, civilian government in 1989 and the subsequent
removal or easing of certain restrictions on trade union rights. 7 Of the thir-
teen countries that were the subject of petitions for review on worker rights
grounds under the current 1991-1992 review cycle, four were accepted for full
review, while three were carried over from the previous cycle."
Numerous country petitions submitted for review to the GSP Subcommittee
have alleged violations of IRWRs in expbrt processing zones.59 In the 1990
review, for example, the Subcommittee examined allegations of worker rights
violations in EPZs in the Dominican Republic, stating that "the Subcommittee
55. Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, El Salvador, Haiti,
Thailand, and Sri Lanka are among the nations that have been the subject of complaints. Some of these
countries were the subject of more than one petition.
The GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (an interagency U.S. government group)
is responsible for making staff-level recommendations on the disposition of worker rights petitions. As part
of this process, the subcommittee publishes "disclosure statements" intended to explain the reasoning
underlying the disposition of each worker rights petition. The disclosure statements, available through the
Office of the USTR, exclude confidential information and deliberations by the Subcommittee.
56. Of the 11 remaining countries, three were the subject of petitions but were not accepted for full
review, five country petitions were first-time submissions in 1991, and three other countries were carried
over from 1990 and are currently under review. Nicaragua and Romania lost GSP status during the general
review. Liberia and Sudan were removed during subsequent annual reviews. Paraguay, Chile, and the
Central African Republic were suspended and subsequently reinstated in February 1991; Myanmar (Burma)
remains suspended. 137 CoNG. REc. S1788-89 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1991).
57. See GSP SuBCOMM. OF THE TRADE POLiCY STAFF COMM., GSP REINSTATEMENT REVIEWS,
WORKER RIGH-Ts SUMMARY: CHILE (February 1991) (Report issued by GSP Information Center, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). Several of the specific reforms cited were the
introduction and passage of a bill legalizing labor union centrals by the Chilean Congress, the de facto
recognition given to the Chilean Unified Workers Central, Chile's largest labor union, and the introduction
of several labor reform bills to modernize the Chilean labor code in the areas of collective negotiations,
employment stability and termination, and the functioning of labor organizations.
58. The four countries accepted for full review were Panama, Sri Lanka, Mauritania, and Thailand.
Of these, only Thailand has been the subject of a previous worker rights review. Bangladesh, El Salvador,
and Syria are the three countries carried over from the 1990-1991 review cycle. See Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Hills Announces Acceptance of 1991 GSP Petitions, August 21, 1991 (Press Release)
(on file with author).
Evaluations of the implementation of the GSP worker rights provisions have been mixed. See
DORMAN, supra note 8, at 15-16. Dorman's procedural and substantive analysis of the GSP program raises
several important issues: the appropriateness of discretionary versus automatic review of petitions, the
weights assigned to each of the five worker rights standards (assuming uneven country performance among
the standards), the distinction, if any, to be made between human and worker rights, and the efficacy of
the *taking steps" language in promoting sustained progress in respect for worker rights. Id. at 5-8; see
also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 11-33 (analyzing implementation of GSP
program).
59. These petitions include Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, and Mexico
(maquiladoras). The Subcommittee did not accept Mexico for full review.
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viewed such allegations as particularly serious given the large number and eco-
nomic importance of EPZs in the Dominican Republic and the requirement of
the 1974 Trade Act that worker rights be afforded in 'any designated zone'
in GSP beneficiary developing countries."60
As part of its determination in April 1991 that the Dominican Republic was
"taking steps to afford IRWRs," the Subcommittee indicated as a positive
development:
[Tihe inclusion of specific language affecting the right of organization in EPZs in
the draft labor code reforms recently submitted to President Balaguer. In addition,
the Subcommittee noted the constructive approach of the government of the Domini-
can Republic to the EPZ union issue.., evident in the original Ministry of Labor
announcement reiterating the right of unions to be formed in EPZs . . . [and] in
public statements by President Balaguer on February 15 supporting the right to
organize in EPZs.6
A broad spectrum of labor unions and human rights groups filed suit
against the U.S. government in March 1990, alleging failure to "enforce the
GSP statute consistent with its express language and the intent of Congress. "62
The plaintiffs argued that the government violated its statutory obligation to
investigate and review all petitions, that it improperly screened petitions on
the basis of non-statutory factors, and that it failed to make the basis for
decisions issued with respect to petitions and country determinations clear.63
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The dismissal
cited an "apparent total lack of standards" in the GSP statute," which when
coupled with statutory discretion and "the President's special and separate
authority in the areas of foreign policy," provided no basis for review of
Presidential actions.65 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment."
Criticism notwithstanding, the GSP program continues to be the major tool
used by advocacy groups for challenging worker-rights violations in beneficiary
countries. Reliance on the GSP program by worker and human rights advocates
will probably continue, given the potential leverage against BDCs exporting
to the United States, the statute's mandatory worker-rights criteria, and a
60. GENERALIZEDSYSTEMOF PREFERENCES (GSP) SuBcoMM. OF THE TRADE PoLIcY STAFF COMM.,
1990 GSP ANNUAL REVIEWS, WORKER Ricirrs REVIEW SUMMARY: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 11 (GSP
Information Center, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1991) [hereinafter
GSP DoMINIcAN REPUBLIC REVIEW].
61. Id. at 13.
62. Plaintiffs Complaint at 21, International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1990), aftd, No. 90-5390, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1060 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 1992)
(per curiam).
63. Id. at 21-23, 27.
64. 752 F. Supp. at 497.
65. Id.
66. International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, No. 90-5390, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
1060, *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 1992) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal on ground of non-justiciability).
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detailed process for petitioning and country reviews set forth in federal regula-
tions.
C. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
OPIC was established by Congress in 196967 as a self-sustaining govern-
ment agency to promote economic growth in developing countries by support-
ing U.S. private investment there. OPIC's insurance and finance programs are
available for new business ventures and expansions in over one hundred
developing countries and specific geographic areas.68 The two principal pro-
grams for assisting U.S. investors are political risk insurance and direct loans
and loan guarantees to finance projects. OPIC will not provide assistance for
projects that may have adverse effects on the U.S. economy or employment
or that do not promise social and economic benefits to the host country.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendment Act of 1985
(OPIC Amendment Act)69 further conditioned OPIC's operability on respect
for internationally recognized worker rights. Section 5 of the Act states that:
The Corporation may insure, reinsure, guarantee, or finance a project only if the
country in which the project is to be undertaken is taking steps to adopt and
implement laws that extend internationally-recognized worker rights, as defined in
section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(4)), to workers in
that country (including any designated zone in that country).7"
The language used, except for that emphasized, is identical to that of the GSP
statute, again incorporating the phrase "any designated zone." OPIC has abided
by the USTR's GSP country practice determinations for countries that have
been the subject of a worker rights review pursuant to the GSP statute. OPIC
makes its own determinations, however, in consultation with the U.S. Depart-
ments of State and Labor, when it receives requests to remove countries that
are not designated GSP beneficiaries. Since 1987, OPIC has suspended cover-
age eligibility for three countries outside the GSP program: Ethiopia in
1987,'71 the People's Republic of China in April 1990,72 and the Republic
of Korea in July 1991.'3
67. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
68. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY (1990) (brochure).
69. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
71. Amato, supra note 4, at 100 n.151, citing OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., Topics 2 (Winter
1987).
72. 136 CONG. REc. E1756 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Rep. Pease).
73. 137 CoNO. REc. E2929 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (statementof Rep. Pease). In making its negative
determination on South Korea, OPIC took into account the government's imposition of new restrictions
on the right to strike by requiring mandatory arbitration in the country's EPZs. See OVERSEAS PRIVATE
INV. CORP., 1991 OPIC WORKER RIGHTS REPORT ON THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2 (1991). In August 1989,
the South Korean Minister of Labor ruled that all firms operating in South Korea's EPZs would henceforth
be treated as "public businesses" and would be subject to the labor law restrictions governing "public
interest" enterprises. Such enterprises are required to submit virtually all disputes to mandatory arbitration,
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D. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the MIGA Act
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, an international develop-
ment organization controlled through the World Bank, seeks to "encourage the
flow of investments for productive purposes among member countries, and in
particular to developing member countries."I MIGA, which began operations
in 1988, performs two functions: 1) insuring investments against political risks
in host countries; and 2) offering technical assistance and policy guidance to
developing countries in order to encourage additional investment. The term
"technical assistance" encompasses "help in promoting investment in a particu-
lar industry or project to assist in amending a country's regulatory framework
for all foreign investment or in strengthening its national investment promotion
agencies. "75 MIGA's decision to underwrite a particular investment is based
on a determination that the proposed investment is economically sound and that
it contributes to the beneficiary country's development.7 6 Investments must
also be consistent with the developing country's "laws, regulations and de-
clared developmental objectives. "I
In 1987, Congress passed the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Act (MIGA Act).7" The MIGA Act makes clear a congressional intent to
ensure that MIGA guarantees do not benefit countries that fail to afford
IRWRs. The MIGA Act authorizes the President to accept membership in
MIGA on behalf of the United States and requires the U.S. Director of the
Agency to seek the adoption of policies and procedures specifying, inter alia,
that MIGA will not guarantee any investment in a country that has not taken
or is not taking steps to afford IRWRs. It also directs the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct the U.S. Director to oppose any guarantee or investment
in a country that has failed to afford IRWRs.79 The MIGA Act further directs
the Secretary of the Treasury to evaluate the extent to which investments were
made in countries that did not afford IRWRs. °
The MIGA Act is more limited in scope than the other provisions discussed
in this section for two reasons. First, the MIGA Act contains no language on
effectively restricting the right to strike. Since firms whose production is dedicated to exports cannot be
considered "essential" or 'public interest" by any accepted international standard, the government's ruling
sanctioned the application of weaker labor laws in South Korea's free export zones relative to the country
as a whole. WorkerRights in Export Processing Zones: Korea, in 2 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 109-
11.
74. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, art. II,
24 I.L.M. 1605 [hereinafter MIGA Convention], reprinted in IBRAHM F.I. SHIHATA, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 356 (1988).
75. SHIHATA, supra note 74, at 202.
76. MIGA Convention, supra note 74, art. 12(d)(i).
77. Id. art. 12(d)(ii), (iii).
78. 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k to 290k-1l (1988).
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designated zones."1 Second, although the U.S. Director must try to prevent
the issuance of guarantees to countries that have not afforded IRWRs, the Act
implicitly recognizes that other member countries may disagree with or oppose
the U.S. Director's actions. The MIGA Act therefore lacks both specific focus
and practical enforceability, although it does serve as a conduit for the identifi-
cation of violations of worker rights.
E. "Section 301"
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301)82 was designed to
enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and to
facilitate U.S. exports through the elimination of foreign trade barriers. Section
1301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Trade Act)
amended Section 301 in a number of ways; it now requires mandatory retalia-
tion if a foreign government is found to have violated a trade agreement or if
"an act, policy or practice of a foreign country is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce." 83
The 1988 Trade Act also amended the scope of the USTR's discretionary
action. The USTR can now condition action on a country's progress in provid-
ing worker rights. Discretionary action in general may be taken if the USTR
determines that "an act, policy, and practice is unreasonable or discriminatory
and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and action by the United
States is appropriate. "'I The Act defines "discriminatory" as including, when
appropriate, "any act, policy, or practice which denies national or most-
favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services or investment. ' '85
An act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is "unreasonable" if it consti-
tutes a "persistent pattern of conduct" that: 1) denies workers the right of
association; 2) denies workers the right to organize and bargain collectively;
3) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor; 4) fails to provide a
minimum age for the employment of children; or 5) fails to provide standards
81. Although the MIGA Act contains no language on EPZs, workers may still be protected. If a
country has its GSP status revoked due to, inter alia, worker rights violations in EPZs, the U.S. Director
would seek to have MIGA take comparable action.
82. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988) (subject to specific direction of President, and to listed
exceptions).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1988). Discretionary action is also subject to presidential direction. The
absence of statutory definition of the term "appropriate" highlights the USTR's broad discretionary powers
in reviewing a country's acts, policies or practices.
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5) (1988). The concepts of national and most-favored-nation treatment are
cornerstones of the international rules of trade. They have no bearing on the discussion of worker rights
provisions incorporated in Section 301.
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for minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of
workers. 6 However, the statute states that:
[A]cts, policies and practices... shall not be treated as being unreasonable if the
Trade Representative determines that (I) the foreign country has taken, or is taking,
actions that demonstrate a significant and tangible overall advancement in providing
throughout the foreign country (including any designated zone within the foreign
country) the rights and other standards described [above], or (II) such acts, policies
and practices are not inconsistent with the level of economic development of the
foreign country. 1
Worker fights language in Section 301 offers more flexibility than language
contained in other U.S. trade statutes with respect to determinations on country
practices. In addition, the requirement that an act, policy, or practice "burden
or restrict" U.S. commerce sets a high threshold for petition acceptance.
Finally, unlike GSP or OPIC worker rights determinations, worker rights
actions under Section 301 are fully discretionary. 8 To date, no worker rights
petitions have been filed with the USTR under Section 301, illustrating the
difficulty its higher acceptance threshold poses for potential petitioners.
F. Department of Labor Report on Worker Rights in EPZs
Congress recently underscored its concern with worker rights in EPZs by
including a new worker rights reporting requirement in the 1988 Trade Act. 9
Section 6306(b) of the Act directs the Secretary of Labor in consultation with
the Secretary of State to conduct a biennial study of the extent to which
countries recognize and enforce, and producers fail to comply with, IRWRs.9 °
The legislative history of Section 6306(b) influenced the Department of Labor's
decision to focus its first report on the provision of worker rights in export
processing zones: 9'
It is the Committee's intent that this study and report identify so-called free trade
or export processing zones where they exist and describe the status of internationally
recognized worker rights within them, including the extent to which those rights
differ in law or practice from those generally existing in those countries.'
The decision of the Department of Labor to focus on the provision of worker
rights in EPZs also reflected ILO concerns about differentially-lower standards
in zones, and allegations of worker rights violations voiced by labor and human
rights groups. The report, released in August 1990, examined the provision
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
87. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d(3)(C(i) (1988).
88. However, mandatory actions under both the GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1988), and OPIC,
22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(3) (1988), are subject to waiver if the President determines that waiver would be
in the national economic interest.
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(6)(d)(iii)(I)-(V) (1988).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 565(1) (1988).
91. 1 WoRKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 1-2. The author participated in the preparation of this report
and had primary responsibility for several country studies.
92. H.R. REP. No. 100-40, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 5, at 95-96 (1987).
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of worker rights in EPZs generally, and in case studies of EPZs in eleven
countries. It found that most governments do not have special labor legislation
or regulations governing EPZs. However, -despite the formal application of
foreign national labor laws in the zones, the study found numerous examples
of efforts by governments and employers to restrict or discourage union
activity. 93
Four countries were found to have explicit legal restrictions in EPZs on
the formation of unions, collective bargaining, or the right to strike.9 It is
generally assumed that governments choose to restrict these rights because they
believe differentially-lower standards and the guarantee of enforced labor
tranquility will serve as an added incentive to attract foreign investment. In
at least six other countries, restrictive practices inhibited the provision of
fundamental worker rights. 9 In three of these countries (the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, and Sri Lanka), EPZ managers denied workers access to
union officials, thus depriving union leaders of the ability to organize, distrib-
ute literature to, or hold meetings with workers. 96 A comparison of unioniza-
tion rates in a country's EPZs with the rates in the country as a whole demon-
strates the chilling effect of such practices. As of 1990, Sri Lanka's 129 EPZ
firms had no unions, while Sri Lanka as a whole had a unionization rate of
about thirty percent.97 Likewise, none of the 220 companies occupying the
eighteen zones in the Dominican Republic was unionized as of mid-1991, even
though employment in the zones accounted for over half of all manufacturing
jobs in the country in 1989.9'
Several recent studies identify EPZs as a growing global phenomenon and
as a spearhead for implementing export-led industrialization strategies through
the development of labor-intensive industries.9 9 While fewer than ten coun-
tries had established EPZs in 1970, by 1986 over fifty countries had created
93. 1 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 7-8.
94. These countries were Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Korea. Bangladesh suspended all labor
laws in the Chittagong EPZ in 1985; the other three countries impose prohibitions or severe restrictions
on the right to strike. Id.
95. These countries include Malaysia, India, Sri Lanka, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia.
Id
96. Id. The study was conducted during 1989-1990. Since then, the Dominican Republic has been
the subject of a worker rights review under the GSP program. A petition to review Sri Lanka was submitted
and accepted as part of the 1991 review cycle. In April 1991, the Dominican Republic was found to be
"taking steps to afford IRWRs" partly on the basis of anticipated progress in enforcement of freedom of
association rights for workers in its EPZs. GSP DoMINIcAN REPuBLIC REvIEw, supra note 60, at 14.
97. BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: SRI LANKA
2 (1990).
98. Between 10 and 12% of the overall Dominican workforce is unionized. See GREGORY K.
SCHOEPFLE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS IN EXPORT ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS IN MEXICO
AND THE CARIBBEAN 3 (1990).
99. See, e.g., 1 WORKERS RIGHTS, supra note 7; Jean Larson Pyle & Leslie M. Dawson, The Impact
of Multinational Technological Transfer on Female Workforces in Asia, 25 COLuM. J. WORLD BUS. 40
(1990); ECONOMIC AND SoCIAL EFFECTS, supra note 2.
Yale Journal of International Law
some 175 zones, with over one hundred more under construction or in the
planning phase. Data since 1986 show accelerated growth in such countries
as Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Mauritius." ° Regional growth has
been especially strong in Asia, Mexico, and the Caribbean.' 0'
IV. WOMEN AND WORKER RIGHTS IN EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES
While the size of EPZ work forces vary considerably from country to
country,na young women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five typi-
cally constitute the vast majority of production workers. For example, women
make up seventy percent of total EPZ employment in the Dominican Republic,
seventy-five percent in Taiwan, ninety percent in Barbados and Jamaica, and
seventy percent in Malaysia."13 Further, because these are percentages of
total employment-including technical, managerial and administrative person-
nel-they tend to understate the proportion of females in production employ-
ment where women are overwhelmingly concentrated.
In Malaysia, for example, where EPZs account for twenty-five percent of
manufacturing employment, women make up eighty-one percent of electrical
and electronics employment and seventy-three percent of textiles and garment
employment. These two industries account for the bulk of employment in a
wide cross-section of EPZs. °4 In Mexico, however, where maquiladoras
accounted for about fifteen percent of manufacturing employment in 1989, the
female share of the production work force had declined from almost eighty
percent in 1976 to sixty-one percent in 1989. This trend has been attributed
to the increasing importance of heavy manufacturing activities (such as in the
transportation equipment sector) relative to light assembly jobs, increased
employment of males in these "traditionally male" jobs, and increased employ-
ment of male technicians and white-collar workers.0 5
Though we have no precise current figures on global EPZ employment,
a conservative estimate would place the total at over three million workers." 6
100. 1 WORKERS RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 3.
101. Id.
102. There are nearly 400,000 workers in Mexican maquiladoras, and over 80,000 each in EPZs in
Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, and Mauritius. Panama, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have fewer than
10,000 workers each in their EPZs. China's "special economic zones," which have a number of traits in
common with the classic EPZ, have an estimated work force of between 1.5 and 2.5 million. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Worker Rights in Export Processing Zones: Malaysia, in 2 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at
140-41.
105. WorkerRights in Export Processing Zones: Mexico, in 2 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 91;.
see also SCHOEPF'LE, supra note 98, at 2, 3; LESLIE SKLAm, ASSEMBLING FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE
MAQUILA INDUSTRY IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 175-77 (1989).
106. This is the author's estimate and includes 1.5 million workers in China's "special economic
zones." Estimates on zone employment in Mexico and the Caribbean nations are derived from data in
ScHo EPLE, supra note 98, at 3. Estimates on zone employment in other regions are derived from data
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Assuming that female production operators constitute seventy-five percent of
this labor force, the total number of women in EPZs is at least 2.25 million.
This estimate is necessarily conservative, insofar as it excludes work subcon-
tracted out by zone firms (the vast majority of which are multinational corpora-
tions) to locally-owned businesses."0 7 Furthermore, the number of women
working in zones or in single-firm equivalents conveys only a narrow estimate
of women working in the export sector of any given country.
Regardless of the measure used, the data underscore the critical role
working women play in the export sector of developing countries. In their
recent study, The Impact of Multinational. Technological Transfer on Female
Workforces in Asia, Professors Pyle and Dawson noted:
Full recognition has not been given to the central role women have played in the
achievement of high growth rates in Asian countries, inasmuch as they constitute
the dominant proportion of the MNC [multinational corporation] manufacturing
workforce .... In general, MNCs have shown a preference for young single
women, often migrants from rural areas, who tend to be unaware of their legal and
trade union rights and who are more amenable to discipline and less likely to cause
industrial strife. Rapid turnover has been encouraged to keep wages depressed. 10
The Department of Labor's study on worker rights in EPZs also corroborated
MNCs' hiring preferences for young female workers. In Malaysia, for exam-
ple, multinational electronics and electrical firms regularly advertise openings
for "female production operators" and often specify an age range of between
seventeen and twenty-five." Advertised positions for skilled workers such
as technicians, supervisors, and line leaders typically specify neither gender
nor age requirements."'
Pyle and Dawson argue, as their central thesis, that MNCs' selection of
production and managerial technologies, with their overarching goal of mini-
mizing unit labor costs, have had distinctly negative consequences for female
workers in export processing zones. Moreover, they assert, by alienating
workers who are also potential consumers, MNCs undermine the goal of
establishing markets in EPZ host countries. The authors maintain that in relent-
lessly pursuing lower manufacturing costs, MNCs have "consistently employed
production processes that are hazardous to workers' health and safety, and
managerial techniques that are in many respects exploitative.""' They cite
the utilization of low-wage strategies predicated on gender-based wage differ-
in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS, supra note 2, at 162-63; 1 & 2 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7,
passim.
107. See Pyle & Dawson, supra note 99, at 42. The authors note that employment figures for zones
in Asia are also understated by the number of women producing as home workers for multinational
enterprises or their subcontractors.
108. Id. at 42, 43.
109. 1 WORKER RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 5.
110. See, e.g., Worker Rights in Export Processing Zones: Malaysia, in 2 WORKER RIGHTS, supra
note 7, at 156 (Malaysia Annex Q (reproducing advertisement placed by multinational corporation).
111. Pyle & Dawson, supra note 99, at 41.
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entials, high production quotas, assembly line speed-ups, and forced over-
time." 2 Even when structural changes such as automation raise skill levels
and wages and tend to upgrade safety conditions, the authors found evidence
of new methods to keep remuneration low: job enlargement at the same wage,
added shifts with no overtime, and firing workers and then rehiring them at
entry-level wages.
13
Pyle and Dawson's characterization of working conditions and managerial
practices prevalent in Asian EPZs would certainly be disputed by some observ-
ers and would assuredly not withstand generalization to EPZs in all countries
or regions."' For example, the authors correctly Cite a dearth of statistical
and epidemiological data on occupational illnesses and injuries in developing
countries. Anecdotal evidence and some documentation support allegations of
health and safety violations in some industries and zones, but it would be
impossible to assert that compliance in zones was generally inferior to compli-
ance in the rest of the foreign national territory." 5 Average wages and com-
pensation in zones also vary among countries and industries, sometimes
exceeding and sometimes falling below comparable foreign national averages.
Nonetheless, recent research supports the claim that the high turnover charac-
teristic of zones may be a function of wage levels that fail to meet subsistence
requirements, especially of women with dependents." 6
What are the implications of worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws
for female workers in EPZs? Insofar as women constitute the majority of the
EPZ production work force, the potential leverage made available through the
application of IRWR provisions to zones may provide a unique boon to women
striving to attain fundamental worker rights, such as the freedom to form a
union or to negotiate a contract to improve wages, hours, and other working
conditions. The operational record of worker rights-linked programs has to date
demonstrated a willingness by administrative agencies to accord due weight
112. Id. at 44.
113. Id. at 41-46.
114. Comparisons of working conditions in zones to conditions outside of zones are, in any event,
contingent on the point of comparison. Conditions in the formal sector (consisting typically of capital-
intensive, larger enterprises generally following government labor laws and other regulations) of developing
countries will tend to be better than in the informal sector (small, often family-owned, labor-intensive
businesses usually outside the purview of foreign national regulation), making any comparisons to conditions
in EPZs relative.
115. See discussion and sources cited in Pyle & Dawson, supra note 99, at 44-45. For instance, many
allegations have been levelled at occupational safety and environmental health conditions in Mexico's
maquiladoras, but it would be difficult to assert that conditions in the maquiladora sector are generally
worse than conditions elsewhere in Mexico. See, e.g., NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INST., CRISIS AT OUR
DOORSTEP: OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO-U.S.-CANADA
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3-4 (1991); LESLIE KOCHAN, THE MAQUILADORAS AND ToXICs: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF PRODUCTION SOUTH OF TIM BORDER 10-12 (1989).
116. SKLAIR, supra note 105, at 178-79.
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to statutory language on "designated zones" when reviewing country practices
and eligibility for participation in preferential programs.
It is beyond the scope of this paper (and in any event, too soon) to evaluate
the impact of worker-rights linked trade laws on conditions for women workers
in EPZs. The worker rights review process has helped spotlight the status of
rights and working conditions in these zones. The publicity generated by the
filing of a petition to review a country's worker rights practices in EPZs may
well raise the profile of workers' and, in particular, female workers' concerns,
and it may prompt bona fide efforts to remedy alleged problems.
On the other hand, the benefits that may accrue to some female workers
by virtue of the statutory reference to "designated zones" are both circumstan-
tial and circumscribed. These benefits are circumstantial for several reasons.
First, they are driven by a process that is by nature politicized, involving
negotiations between advocacy groups and administrative agencies, as well as
government-to-government negotiations, when millions of dollars' worth of
trade or investment benefits are perceived to be at risk.117 Second, only a
narrow group of female workers in a particular phase of their productive work
lives may be able to take advantage of these improvements. Barring major
changes in the structure of EPZ production and managerial technologies, high
labor turnover (for reasons of either demand or supply) is likely to be a
continuing characteristic of zone employment patterns.'
Potential benefits for female workers in EPZs are also circumscribed by
the flexibility permitted in the application of worker rights standards," 9 and,
above all, through the omission of statutory language on discrimination. Lower
working standards or conditions based on gender simply cannot be addressed
under worker rights-linked U.S. trade statutes as long as these standards meet
a minimum threshold of acceptability commensurate with a country's level of
development. The same is true for a host of other issues critical to the welfare
of women workers: equal pay for equal work, maternity leave, child care, job
117. This process assumes that a petition or request (in the case of OPIC) is taken up for investigation
and review.
118. As discussed earlier, on the demand side, MNCs have expressed clear hiring preferences for
young women in a narrow age range. Issues of age discrimination, job tenure, and job security fall outside
of the scope of IRWRs as defined in U.S. trade laws. On the supply side, high turnover may reflect
dissatisfaction with any number of work-related factors, also beyond the scope of the statutes.
119. This is especially true of minimum-age standards for employment and acceptable conditions of
work. To give one hypothetical example: the U.S. statutory threshold for "acceptable conditions of work
with respect to minimum wages" (19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4)(E) (1988)) could arguably be met through the
establishment of industry-specific or occupation-specific minimum wages (which are not incompatible with
ILO standards in this area). Since certain industries such as textiles/garments and electricallelectronics are
often concentrated in EPZs, the effect might be differentially-lower minimum wages in EPZs, which,
because they would be "masked" as industry-specific floors, meet the U.S. statutory test. If these lower
minimum standards were found to have a "disparate impact" on women, the ILO might view them as an
indirect form of discrimination. U.S. trade laws, however, do not address discrimination.
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security, job tenure, sexual harassment, and equal opportunity for job advance-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION
Under optimal circumstances, U.S. international trade laws containing
worker rights provisions may afford indirect benefits to some female workers
previously unprotected by their nations' laws. However, U.S. trade laws
cannot guarantee that benefits will be institutionalized on the foreign national
level, nor do they begin to address the multiplicity of obstacles faced by so
many working women in developing countries struggling to support themselves
and their families. Statutory language making employment discrimination an
actionable criterion under worker rights-linked trade laws could, in theory,
afford greater protection to women workers in developing countries. However,
the addition of any language on discrimination certainly would not be limited
to gender discrimination alone. Making all forms of discrimination an action-
able criterion would probably impose an administrative burden on the imple-
mentation of these laws that would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet
under current resource constraints. Thus, the inclusion of anti-discrimination
language should not be viewed as a clear-cut panacea to the problems faced
by female workers in developing countries.
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